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Abstract 
This article explores and critically assesses the recent case law adjudicated by WTO 
panels and investment arbitral tribunals on cultural diversity related disputes. 
Adopting a socio-legal approach, this study focuses on the role that adjudicators 
have played in mapping the interactions between international economic law and 
the international cultural law i.e. international law protecting cultural diversity. 
While arbitrators have started to accommodate cultural values in argumentation 
patterns, WTO panels and even the WTO Appellate Body have adopted a more 
cautious approach. This paper identifies the socio-legal reasons that may contribute 
to these different approaches.  
This study will proceed as follows. First, I will briefly define the multifaceted 
concept of cultural diversity and sketch out the relevant UNESCO instrument. 
Second, I shall analyze the available dispute settlement mechanisms. Third, the 
conflict areas between international economic law and cultural diversity law will be 
scrutinized through the analysis of some relevant case studies. Fourth, this 
contribution critically assesses the role that adjudicators play in adjudicating 
interdisciplinary disputes. Finally, some conclusions will be drawn. 
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Introduction 
This paper explores and critically assesses some recent cases adjudicated by WTO 
dispute settlement bodies and arbitral tribunals on the interplay between 
international economic law and international cultural law. While other studies have 
analyzed the interplay between international economic law and cultural diversity 
from an institutional perspective, by focusing on treaty law and/or the historical 
articulation of the dichotomy between trade and culture (Germann 2006, Donders 
2008, Burri Nenova 2010a), this paper adopts a socio-legal approach, by focusing 
on the role that adjudicators have played in mapping the interactions between two 
different sets of norms. The underlying assumption is that adjudication is a mode of 
governance, and has a fundamental importance with regard to the concrete 
implementation of a given legal regime. While some authors have already 
scrutinized whether and how the WTO panels and Appellate Body have dealt with 
cultural diversity, a study focusing on the relevant arbitral case law is missing. This 
study aims to address this lacuna in contemporary legal studies and may contribute 
to the current debate on the unity or fragmentation of international law. The survey 
of the relevant case law presents mixed results. While investment treaty arbitration 
has started to accommodate cultural values in the reasoning of arbitral awards 
(Vadi 2009), WTO panels and even the WTO Appellate Body have adopted a much 
more cautious approach to the introduction of cultural values in their decision 
framework. This paper explores the socio-legal reasons that can explain these 
different approaches. 
This study will proceed as follows. First, I will define the multifaceted concept of 
cultural diversity and sketch out the main tenets of the relevant UNESCO 
instruments. Second, the available dispute settlement mechanisms will be sketched 
out. Third, the conflict areas between international economic law and international 
cultural law will be scrutinized through the analysis of some relevant case studies. 
Fourth, this contribution critically assesses the role that adjudicators play in 
adjudicating interdisciplinary disputes. Finally, some conclusions will be drawn. 
 
1. Cultural Diversity 
Cultural diversity can be defined as ‘the manifold ways in which the culture of 
groups and societies finds expression’, and ‘is made manifest not only through the 
varied ways in which the cultural heritage of humanity is expressed, […] but also 
through diverse modes of artistic creation, production, dissemination, distribution 
and enjoyment, whatever the means and technologies used’ (UNESCO 2005 Article 
4.1). Cultural diversity is thus an inclusive concept which holds two interrelated 
components: culture and diversity. In order to understand what cultural diversity 
means, one needs to explore both its parts.  
Three different meanings of culture can be identified (Eide 1995):  1) culture in its 
material sense, as the product of a given cultural process; 2) culture in its 
immaterial sense as a process of artistic or scientific creation; 3) culture in its 
anthropological sense, that is, culture as a way of life. Cultural diversity in the 
narrow sense draws upon the last meaning of culture, whereby culture is holistically 
meant as ‘the set[s] of distinctive spiritual, material, intellectual and emotional 
features of society’ which encompass in addition to art and literature lifestyles, 
ways of living together, values systems, traditions and beliefs (UNESCO 2001). 
Cultural diversity in the broader sense embodies the three above-mentioned 
meanings of culture: cultural diversity is not limited to cultural goods (Burri Nenova 
2010b) but also includes the protection of tangible and intangible cultural heritage. 
As culture is not a static concept but a fluid and dynamic force which changes over 
time, it is by nature diverse. Thus, diversity is inextricable from culture (UNESCO 
2002). 
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In the past decade, cultural diversity has come to the forefront of legal and policy 
debate. At the normative level, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organization (UNESCO 1945) has promoted the understanding of cultural 
diversity as a desirable goal. Respect for the diversity of cultures, dialogue and 
cooperation are deemed to be among the best guarantees of international peace 
and security (UNESCO 1945, preamble); the recognition of cultural diversity 
together with the awareness of the unity of mankind can lead to greater solidarity; 
finally, cultural exchanges  create the conditions for renewed dialogue among 
civilizations (UNESCO 2001, preamble). If the wide diffusion of culture is deemed to 
be indispensable to the dignity of man and to constitute a ‘sacred duty’ which all 
the nations must fulfil in a spirit of mutual assistance (UNESCO 1945, preamble), 
cultural diversity is deemed to represent ‘an ethical imperative inseparable from 
respect for human dignity’(ECOSOC 2009, § 40) and ‘the common heritage of 
humanity’ (UNESCO 2001, Article 1). 
UNESCO’s commitment to protect cultural diversity has reinforced traditional state 
authority in the cultural sector. Cultural sovereignty, i.e. the freedom of any State 
to choose its cultural model, beyond its own political, economic and social system, 
has traditionally fallen within the domestic jurisdiction of the state (Pineschi 2010). 
International cultural law has reinforced the cultural sovereignty of states and their 
top-down capacity to regulate individuals in the cultural domain (Morijn 2008). At 
the same time, the UNESCO has diffused the idea that cultural diversity is a 
common heritage of mankind and has attributed an international relevance to 
cultural goods and values that used to fall within the domestic jurisdiction 
(Francioni 2008). This paper focuses on the states’ cultural policies as claims before 
international economic courts are based on states’ regulatory behaviour. 
 
2. When Cultures Collide: The Tension between Cultural Diversity and 
Economic Globalization 
Globalization has brought cultures and people into closer contact than ever before 
(Sassen 1999). The enhanced interaction between cultures brings a series of 
opportunities. By leading to more choice for consumers, trade and foreign direct 
investment may enhance cultural diversity and media pluralism thus facilitating free 
speech, free flow of ideas and constant exchanges and interaction between cultures 
(UNESCO 2005, preamble). However, the enhanced interaction between cultures 
can endanger cultural diversity (UNDP 2004, p. 10). While the growing international 
trade and investment in cultural products constitutes an important part of the 
global economy (Peng 2008), the products of large producers tend to crowd out the 
products of smaller producers. Due to economies of scale, the current asymmetry 
in flows and exchanges of cultural goods at the global level jeopardizes cultural 
diversity possibly leading to cultural homogenization and ultimately to ‘cultural 
hegemony’. Cultural hegemony is a sociological concept, originated by the 
philosopher Antonio Gramsci. In its original meaning, cultural hegemony indicates 
that a society can be ruled or dominated by one of its social classes that is able to 
impose on other groups, through everyday practices and shared beliefs, their views 
until they are internalized, creating the conditions for a complex system of control 
(Gramsci 1948). In this paper I use this term more broadly to indicate the 
predominance of a certain national culture over other competing cultures. 
Do states have a right to preserve ‘shelf-space’ for national cultural products and 
services? Are cultural goods like other goods? Posner famously argued that cultural 
property is just another form of property and is not entitled to differential 
treatment: cultural considerations should not affect the market-based exchange of 
goods (Posner 2006). Posner’s analysis was driven by efficiency concerns and the 
rationale of the comparative advantage.  
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However, the idea that cultural goods have a double nature i.e. economic and 
cultural and thus deserve special consideration by policy makers has increasingly 
gained prominence at the theoretical and normative levels. At the theoretical level, 
arguments are made that cost-benefit analysis is flawed for public sector decisions. 
As cultural goods have a societal relevance, they should not be assigned mere 
monetary value (Ackermann and Heinzerling, 2004). Most notably, the 2005 
UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural 
Expressions, often referred to as Convention on Cultural Diversity (CCD) (UNESCO 
2005), reaffirms ‘the sovereign rights of States to maintain, adopt and implement 
policies and measures that they deem appropriate for the protection and promotion 
of the diversity of cultural expressions on their territory’( UNESCO 2005, Article1). 
At the root of this Convention was the need to safeguard the state power to 
encourage its national audio-visual sector - the sector with the highest economic 
value- against the general applicability of free trade (Wouters and Vidal 2010). 
Having failed to overcome the resistance by the United States against the inclusion 
of a cultural exception into the law of the World Trade Organization and the 
proposed Multilateral Agreement on Investment, the EU and other actors, most 
notably Canada, ‘abandoned their defensive approach and opted for a proactive 
stance’ (Herold 2006).  
During the negotiations the positions were polarized (Donders 2008). As Kelsey 
points out, ‘The US delegation made constant and vigorous interventions 
throughout the drafting process […] even though the US was unlikely ever to ratify 
the instrument – a tactic it applied with considerable success in negotiations on 
numerous environmental and human rights treaties […]’(Kelsey 2008, p. 248) 
When the Convention was finalized, the US protested that decisions by voting had 
undermined the spirit of consensus that normally characterized UNESCO decision 
making; more substantially it objected that the Convention was not about culture 
but about trade, and thus exceeded the mandate of UNESCO (Kelsey 2008).  
Political and sociological considerations lead to the conclusion that if the negotiators 
agreed on the CCD this was deemed to be a desirable political and legal outcome 
notwithstanding some visible flaws. While some countries, most notably the EU and 
Canada, looked for creating a counter-weight to free trade discourse, the CCD goes 
beyond this limited goal and contributes to giving culture a place on the 
international political agenda. While the Convention deals with only one aspect of 
cultural diversity, that is cultural expressions, other aspects of cultural diversity are 
already covered by other UNESCO Conventions: the Convention concerning the 
Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage (1972) and the Convention for 
the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage (2003). Not only do these 
Conventions introduce a compelling case or argumentative framework for the 
consideration of cultural diversity in policy making and adjudication but also create 
a normative framework for good cultural governance (Du Plessis and Rautenbach 
2010).    
Cultural governance expresses the need to regulate human activities and their 
effects on cultural diversity (including, for example, cultural heritage, cultural 
practices and cultural goods and services) by means of processes mandated by law 
so as to protect the cultural interests of present and future generations (Du Plessis 
and Rautenbach 2010). Cultural governance entails a number of ‘legislative, 
executive and administrative functions, instruments and ancillary processes that 
could be used by governments […] to organize and regulate culturally relevant 
activities’ (Du Plessis and Rautenbach 2010 p. 46). Good cultural governance refers 
to the exercise of state authority (Du Plessis and Rautenbach 2010 p. 48) according 
to due process and the rule of law which includes the respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms (Du Plessis and Rautenbach 2010 p. 62). In this sense, the 
CCD is not to be implemented at the entire discretion of the parties. To the 
contrary, the Convention requires respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, such as freedom of expression, information and communication. Article 
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2.1 CCD expressly affirms that ‘cultural diversity can be protected and promoted 
only if human rights and fundamental freedoms, such as freedom of expression, 
information and communication […] are guaranteed.’[emphasis added]  
The Convention does not modify rights and obligations under other treaties, but 
requires parties to perform in good faith their obligations under the CCD and all 
other treaties to which they are parties. Without subordinating the CCD to any 
other treaty, Article 20 CCD states that the parties shall foster mutual 
supportiveness between the CCD and the other treaties to which they are parties. 
The Convention also requires parties to take into account the obligations and 
relevant provisions of the Convention when interpreting and applying the other 
treaties to which they are parties. In sum, Article 20 CCD puts forward the principle 
of mutual supportiveness, complementarity and non-subordination with other 
conventions. Although it is unclear how this principle can be applied to concrete 
situations and this clause has been criticized as a chimera or a Pyrrhic victory 
(Kelsey 2010), it should not be dismissed by adjudicators as a mere agreement to 
disagree. The provision is included in a binding treaty which requires ‘taking into 
account’ the provisions of the CCD when interpreting other treaties.  
The fact that the CCD does not set out a hierarchical relation between international 
cultural law and international economic law merely reflects the paradigm shift of 
contemporary international relations from a pyramidal model of international 
organization to a network system (Van Den Kerchov and Ost 2002) or spaghetti 
bowl (Bhagwati 1995). As it is difficult to articulate the interaction of different legal 
paradigms at the normative level, this articulation was left to the adjudicative 
branch. The inclusion of the interpretative provision in the CCD does not void this 
attempt to create a counter balance to the embedded liberalism which underpins 
international economic law but only creates further arenas of contestation. 
 
3. The Dispute Settlement Mechanisms 
The disparity between international cultural law and international economic law is 
particularly evident in how their disputes are settled. Because international cultural 
law is still in its infancy, it presents embryonic features and lacks a dispute 
settlement mechanism. The proposals to establish a World Heritage Court for the 
settlement of disputes with cultural elements have not been successful (Chechi 
2009). Many political considerations oppose the establishment of such a dispute 
settlement mechanism. First, how do we define a ‘cultural’ dispute? Second, would 
states ever relinquish their cultural sovereignty? Third, litigation may not be the 
proper context for settling this kind of disputes. As an author points out, ‘cultural 
heritage disputes are often multidimensional, involving not only complex legal 
issues, but also sensitive, not necessarily legal elements, of an emotional, ethical, 
historical, moral, political, religious, or spiritual nature’ (Theurich 2009). Because of 
the distinct features of these disputes, stakeholders tend to prefer alternative 
dispute resolution. 
In this sense, the CCD does not provide for a compulsory dispute settlement 
mechanism but requires mandatory negotiations. If the parties cannot reach 
agreement by negotiation, they ‘may jointly seek the good offices of, or request 
mediation by a third party’ (CCD, Article 25.2). If these procedures fail, the parties 
‘may have recourse to conciliation in accordance with the procedure laid down in 
the Annex of this Convention’ (CCD, Article 25.3). The parties are then under an 
obligation to consider in good faith the proposal for the resolution of the dispute 
made by the Conciliation Commission established on an ad hoc basis (CCD, Article 
25.3). Such a system is characterized by the almost complete lack of enforceable 
substantive provisions.  While this ‘dispute settlement mechanism is worth 
mentioning only as being reminiscent of the very early days of modern international 
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law’ (Hahn 2006), its characteristics also reflect the delicate nature of the subject 
matter of the possible disputes.   
By contrast, international economic law is characterized by well-developed and 
sophisticated dispute settlement mechanisms. While the dispute settlement 
mechanism of the World Trade Organization (DSU 1994) has been defined as the 
‘jewel in the crown’ of this organization (Narlikar 2005), investment treaty 
arbitration has become the most successful mechanism for settling investment-
related disputes (Franck 2009).    
The creation of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body determined a major shift from 
the political consensus-based dispute settlement system of the GATT 1947 (GATT 
1947) to a rule-based, architecture designed to strengthen the multilateral trade 
system (Crowley and Jackson 1996). The WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism is 
compulsory, exclusive and highly effective (Van den Bossche 2008). The decisions 
of panels and the Appellate Body are binding on the parties, and the Dispute 
Settlement Understanding provides remedies for breach of WTO law.  
At the procedural level, when cultural diversity related trade disputes emerge, 
Article 23.1 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the 
Settlement of Disputes (DSU) obliges Members to subject the dispute exclusively to 
WTO bodies (DSU, Article 23.1). In US – Section 301 Trade Act, the Panel held that 
Members ‘have to have recourse to the DSU DSM to the exclusion of any other 
system’ (US – Section 301 § 7.43). In Mexico – Soft Drinks the Appellate Body 
clarified that the provision even implies that ‘that Member is entitled to a ruling by 
a WTO panel’ (Mexico – Soft Drinks § 52). Pursuant to WTO settled case law and 
Arts. XXIII:1 of the GATT 1994 each WTO Member which considers any of its 
benefits under the covered Agreement prejudiced can bring a case before a panel. 
In parallel, investment treaties provide investors direct access to an international 
arbitral tribunal. This is a major novelty in international law, as customary 
international law does not provide such a mechanism. The use of the arbitration 
model is aimed at depoliticizing disputes, avoiding potential national court bias and 
ensuring the advantages of confidentiality and effectiveness (Shihata 1986). 
Arbitral tribunals review state acts in the light of their investment treaties, and this 
review has been compared to a sort of administrative review. Authors postulate the 
existence of a global administrative space in which the strict dichotomy between 
domestic and international has largely broken down (Krisch and Kingsbury 2006). 
Under this theoretical framework, investor-state arbitration has been 
conceptualized as a global administrative law (GAL) creature (Van Harten and 
Loughlin 2006, p. 121), which impels states to conform with GAL principles and to 
adopt principles of good governance.  
Given the structural imbalance between the vague and non-binding dispute 
settlement mechanisms provided by the Convention on Cultural Diversity and the 
highly effective and sophisticated dispute settlement mechanisms available under 
international economic law, cultural diversity disputes involving investors’ or 
traders’ rights have often been brought before international economic law fora. 
Obviously, this does not mean that these are the only available fora, let alone the 
superior fora for this kind of dispute. Other fora are available such as national 
courts, human rights courts, regional economic courts and the traditional state-to-
state fora such as the International Court of Justice or even inter state arbitration. 
Some of these dispute settlement mechanisms may be more suitable than investor-
state arbitration or the WTO dispute settlement mechanism to address cultural 
concerns. Given its scope, this study focuses on the jurisprudence of the WTO 
bodies and arbitral tribunals.          
One may wonder whether the fact that cultural diversity disputes tend to be 
adjudicated before international economic law fora determines a sort of institutional 
bias. With regard to the WTO DSB, ‘it is quite uncontroversial that an adjudicatory 
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system engaged in interpreting trade-liberalizing standards would tend to favor free 
trade (Trachtman 1999). Recent empirical studies have also shown that there is a 
consistently high rate of Complainant success in WTO dispute resolution (Maton and 
Maton 2008) and authors have theorized that ‘the WTO panels and the WTO 
Appellate Body have interpreted the WTO agreements in a manner that consistently 
promotes the goal of expanding trade, often to the detriment of respondents’ 
negotiated and reserved regulatory competencies’ (Colares 2009, p. 388). In 
particular, given the fact that about 80% of the cases have been settled in favour 
of the claimant, Colares has highlighted that ‘the DSB has evolved WTO norms in a 
manner that consistently favors litigants whose interests are generally aligned with 
the unfettered expansion of trade.’ (Colares 2009, p. 387) This study questions 
whether the same ‘institutional bias’ is present in investor-state arbitration and 
whether and how adjudicators have an important role to play in adjudicating these 
disputes. 
 
4. International Economic Disputes with Cultural Elements 
As the number of disputes with cultural elements continues to increase, it is 
important to reflect on the method for identifying and characterizing such disputes. 
In a preliminary way, no two parties will agree that a dispute is essentially ‘cultural’ 
(Sands 2007). Indeed, the mere definition of a dispute as a ‘cultural dispute’ may 
have implications for a case. Therefore, it seems more appropriate to talk about 
‘disputes which have a cultural component’ or ‘cultural diversity related disputes’ 
rather than to characterize a dispute as ‘cultural’. This neutral approach is based on 
the consideration that cultural diversity related claims are rarely, if ever, raised in 
isolation from other international legal arguments. Still, the fact that cultural 
diversity related claims are raised together with other claims, does not erase their 
cultural quality, but simply emphasizes the need to ascertain such a quality in the 
merit phase of the proceeding. 
In general terms, cultural diversity related international economic disputes are 
characterized by the need to balance the legitimate interests of a state to adopt 
cultural policies on the one hand, and the legitimate interests of foreign investors 
and traders to protect their property rights on the other. Several issues arise in this 
context. While environmental concerns have been somehow integrated in 
investment treaties and in GATT Article XX(g), cultural diversity receives much less 
attention if any. In the vast majority of international economic law treaties, cultural 
diversity is not mentioned at all. If cultural concerns are mentioned, the relevant 
clauses remain rather vague. The very fact that the balancing process occurs in the 
context of investor-state arbitration or the DSB could lead to the procedure being 
deemed biased in favour of the investors or traders. 
Turning our attention to the emerging case law, it is becoming clear that there is no 
such thing as a typical dispute involving cultural diversity. Adopting the broader 
meaning of cultural diversity, the analyzed disputes operate across the board, 
arising in relation to investment in mineral exploitation, tourism, the media and 
other sectors (Peterson 2010). For instance, investors may claim that certain forms 
of regulation constitute an indirect expropriation or regulatory taking, and that 
compensation has to be paid. If a direct expropriation has occurred, claims may 
concern the amount of compensation. In other cases, investors may claim that a 
stabilization clause has not been respected due to regulatory change or that certain 
regulations amount to prohibited performance requirements. Other claims may 
concern discrimination or the violation of the fair and equitable treatment. At the 
WTO level, a number of disputes have related to the principle of non-discrimination 
or the prohibition of quantitative restrictions.  
These disputes illustrate a potential ‘clash of cultures’ (Hahn 2006 and Voon 2006) 
between the neo-liberalism embedded in contemporary international economic 
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governance and the regulatory power of the host state to enact measures to 
protect and promote cultural diversity. Therefore, it is important to analyze recent 
case law that has involved elements of cultural diversity, in order to verify whether 
these cases have adequately dealt with non-investment values. 
 
5. Investment Disputes Involving Cultural Diversity 
A survey of the relevant investor-state arbitrations shows that international 
investment law has not yet developed any institutional machinery for the protection 
of cultural diversity through investment dispute settlement. After all, international 
investment law is not intended to protect cultural diversity. However, in recent 
years, a jurisprudential trend has emerged which not only takes cultural diversity 
into consideration, but strikes an appropriate balance between the different 
interests concerned (Vadi 2009).  
The Glamis Gold Case involved a cathedral without walls (Cantegreil 2007 and Vadi 
2011) an area of cultural importance to a Quechan tribe which deems it to be a 
sacred place. When Glamis Gold, a Canadian mining company, planned to mine 
gold in the area, the tribe opposed the project. As the 2000 environmental impact 
study indicated that the best option was that of ‘no action’, the Department of the 
Interior withdrew the Imperial Project from further mineral entry for 20 years to 
protect historic properties (Glamis Gold v. US § 152). In 2002, however, permission 
for the project was granted and the State Mining and Geology Board enacted 
emergency regulations requiring the backfilling of all open-pit mines to re-create 
the approximate contours of the land prior to mining (Glamis Gold v. US § 183).  
Because the Interior Department failed to promptly approve the project and 
California’s regulation required the backfilling of open-pit gold mines, allegedly 
making its mining operation uneconomical, the investor filed an investor state 
arbitration, arguing that state and federal measures constituted an indirect 
expropriation in violation of Article 1110 of NAFTA. The claimant asserted that the 
federal and state actions constituted a ‘continuum of facts’ which deprived its 
property rights of their value (Glamis Gold v. US § 358). In particular, backfilling 
would be uneconomical and arbitrary since it would not be rationally related to its 
stated purpose of protecting cultural resources (Glamis Gold v. US § 321). The 
claimant pointed out that ‘once you take the material out [of] the ground and if 
there are cultural resources on the surface, they are destroyed. Putting the dirt 
back in the pit actually does not protect those resources’ but may lead to the burial 
of more artifacts and cause greater environmental degradation (Glamis Gold v. US 
§ 687). Thus, the claimant argued that the California measures aimed ‘to stop the 
Imperial project from ever proceeding while seeking to avoid payment of 
compensation it knew to be required had it processed transparently and directly 
through eminent domain’ (Glamis Gold v. US § 703).    
The arbitral tribunal found the claimant’s argument to be without merit (Glamis 
Gold v. US § 360). In order to distinguish a non-compensable regulation and a 
compensable expropriation, the tribunal established a two-tiered test, under which 
it had to ascertain:  (1) the extent to which the measures interfered with 
reasonable and investment-backed expectations of a stable regulatory framework; 
and (2) the purpose and the character of the governmental actions taken (Glamis 
Gold v. US § 356). First, the tribunal found that the California backfilling measures 
‘did not cause a sufficient economic impact to the Imperial Project to effect an 
expropriation of claimant’s investment’ (Glamis Gold v. US § 536). Second, the 
tribunal deemed the measures to be rationally related to its stated purpose (Glamis 
Gold v. US § 803). The tribunal admitted that ‘some cultural artefacts will indeed be 
disturbed, if not buried, in the process of excavating and backfilling’(Glamis Gold v. 
US § 805), but concluded that, without such legislative measures, the landscape 
would be harmed by significant pits and waste piles in the near vicinity (Glamis 
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Gold v. US § 805). Remarkably, the arbitral tribunal also expressly referred to 
Article 12 of the World Heritage Convention, which requires States to protect their 
cultural heritage even if it is not listed in the World Heritage lists. This is rather 
extraordinary as cultural heritage experts have repeatedly stressed that Article 12 
of the WHC is an often neglected provision (Lenzerini 2008, O’Keefe 1994).  
The Lemire case also represents an excellent case study as it involved several 
claims related to media rights and may be related to cultural diversity in the form 
of intangible cultural heritage, linguistic diversity and cultural freedom. Mr. Lemire 
inter alia challenged the fact that a tender for a radio channel required it to 
broadcast in Ukrainian only. Mr. Lemire argued that the 100% Ukrainian language 
content requirement favoured national vis-à-vis foreign investors. It was no 
surprise that the foreign investor who was participating to the bidding process was 
not awarded the license. The arbitral tribunal dismissed the arguments in support of 
cultural freedom brought by Mr. Lemire that ‘We should allow the audience to 
determine what it wants’ and that ‘since Ukraine is seeking the status of a country 
with a market economy, it should not introduce Ukrainian culture by force’ (Lemire 
v Ukraine, § 407). Instead, the arbitral tribunal held that this condition of the 
bidding process ‘was a legitimate decision, based on a public interest choice to 
extend the use of Ukrainian in the media’ arguably contributing to the preservation 
and diffusion of Ukrainian culture (Lemire v Ukraine, § 407).  
Finally, as the Ukrainian Law on Television and Radio Broadcasting required that at 
least 50% of the general broadcasting of each radio company should be music 
produced in Ukraine (Lemire v Ukraine § 227), the claimant argued that the 50% 
local music requirement implied a violation of Article II.6 of the US-Ukraine BIT, 
namely of the prohibition to ‘impose performance requirements …which specify that 
goods and services must be purchased locally, or which impose any other similar 
requirements’ (Lemire v Ukraine, § 503). In the claimant’s opinion, the abnormal 
high level of the requirement caused significant damages, because its program 
concept was based 100% on hits. As there were too few hits of Ukrainian music, it 
had to continuously replay the same few Ukrainian hits (Lemire v Ukraine, § 503). 
Thus, the claimant stated that he suffered loss of advertising revenue.  
In the opinion of the respondent, however, local music requirements were justified 
on ‘public policy grounds’ (Lemire v Ukraine, § 218). and the Ukrainian Law on 
Television and Broadcasting (LTR) should be considered ‘as part of the State’s 
legitimate right to organize broadcasting’ (Lemire v Ukraine, § 227). In the Annex 
to the BIT both States reserved the right to make or maintain limited exceptions to 
the national treatment principle with regard to radio broadcasting stations (Lemire 
v Ukraine § 242). More importantly, Ukraine claimed that: 
 
“In all jurisdictions, Radio and TV are special sectors subject to specific regulations. There 
are two reasons for this: - first, radio frequencies are by technical nature scarce assets, and 
consequently the law must articulate systems for allocating licenses to prospective bidders; - 
but there is also a second reason: when regulating private activity in the media sector, 
states can, and frequently do, take into consideration a number of legitimate policy issues: 
thus media companies can be subject to specific regulation and supervision in order to 
guarantee transparency, political and linguistic pluralism, protection of children or minorities 
and other similar factors”(Lemire v Ukraine § 241).  
 
The Arbitral Tribunal upheld Ukraine’s line of argument. In a preliminary fashion, it 
considered that the local music requirement applied to all broadcasters in Ukraine 
(Lemire v Ukraine § 501). Then, it affirmed: 
 
“As a sovereign state, Ukraine has the inherent right to regulate its affairs and 
adopt laws in order to protect the common good of its people, as defined by its 
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Parliament and Government. The prerogative extends to promulgating regulations 
which define the State’s own cultural policy. The promotion of domestic music may 
validly reflect a State policy to preserve and strengthen cultural inheritance and 
national identity. The “high measure of deference that international law generally 
extends to the right of domestic authorities to regulate matters within their own 
borders” is reinforced in cases when the purpose of the legislation affects deeply 
felt cultural or linguistic traits of the community.” [emphasis added, internal 
citations omitted] (Lemire v Ukraine § 505).  
    
The arbitral tribunal inquired about the international society’s prevailing ideas about 
ways to protect national culture. In this sense, the Lemire tribunal held: ‘the desire 
to protect national culture is not unique to Ukraine’ and took into account the fact 
that ‘a number of other countries impose similar requirements’ (Lemire v Ukraine § 
501). For instance, France requires that radio stations broadcast a minimum of 
40% of French music, and Portugal has a 25-40% Portuguese music quota (Lemire 
v Ukraine § 501). Therefore, the tribunal held that such requirement could not be 
deemed to be ‘unfair’ or ‘inequitable’ (Lemire v Ukraine § 507). 
The tribunal then asked whether the prohibition of performance requirements was 
applicable to a cultural restriction like the 50% Ukrainian music requirement. To 
answer to this question, the tribunal interpreted Article II.6 of the BIT adopting two 
different interpretation criteria: the textual interpretation and teleological 
interpretation (Lemire v Ukraine § 508). Looking at the ordinary meaning of Article 
II.6 of the BIT, this provision clearly prohibited local laws’ requirements that ‘goods 
or services …must be purchased locally’. While the Ukrainian law did not specify 
that radio stations should purchase local goods and it did not prohibit them from 
obtaining Ukrainian music from non-Ukrainian sources, Ukrainian music was de 
facto produced and commercialized locally (Lemire v Ukraine § 509). With regard to 
the object and purpose of Article II.6 of the BIT, the arbitral tribunal held that it 
was ‘trade-related: to avoid that states imposed local content requirements as a 
protection of local industries against competing imports’ (Lemire v Ukraine § 510). 
Since the objective of the local law was ‘not to protect local industries and restrict 
imports, but rather to promote Ukraine’s cultural inheritance’ it was deemed to be 
‘compatible with Article II.6 of the BIT’ (Lemire v Ukraine § 510). 
 
6. Cultural Diversity Trade Related Disputes 
GATT/WTO Panels and the Appellate Body have confronted the issue of culture 
versus trade several times, and ‘have consistently confirmed that culture does not 
have any special status in the GATT/WTO regime’ (Peng 2008). Both panels and the 
AB tend ‘not to radically alter the “delicate and carefully negotiated balance” of the 
WTO Agreements’, but rather ‘follow the conventional analysis’ and ‘concentrate on 
the core trade-related questions that fall within the DSB’s authority’(Burri Nenova 
2008).     
In an early case, Japan- Measures on Imports of Leather, Japan had established an 
import licensing scheme to limit the imports of certain leather goods, in order to 
protect a cultural minority, the Dowa mainly employed in the leather industry. 
Japan explained that a segment of the Japanese society had suffered discrimination 
for centuries due to social exclusion originated during the Japanese feudal period 
(Japan- Leather § 21.i) Although the people of Dowa districts had already been 
emancipated from institutional discrimination in the XIX century, ‘this emancipation 
was only formal as in actual social life, these people continued to lead a destitute 
life under miserable conditions…’ (Japan- Leather § 21.iv) Japan added that the 
measures at stake ‘constituted more than a minority problem’ and related to 
‘subsistence and survival’ (Japan- Leather § 22). The US however argued that 
import quotas were not an acceptable way of solving domestic social problems 
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which were irrelevant to the case and irrelevant to the terms of reference of the 
panel (Japan- Leather § 20).  
The GATT Panel noted that while the United States approach was based essentially 
on legal arguments, ‘Japan’s case, on the other hand, rested almost entirely on 
considerations resulting from the particular problems connected with […] the Dowa 
people (Japan- Leather § 41). It also noted that Japan had not invoked any 
provision of the GATT to justify the maintenance of the quota. The panel concluded 
that the import licensing scheme constituted an import quota which was in violation 
of GATT Article XI and that  
 
“[…] it was not for it to establish whether the present measures would be justified 
under any GATT provision […] The Panel considered that the special historical, 
cultural and socio-economic circumstances referred to by Japan could not be taken 
into account by it in this context since its terms of reference were to examine the 
matter ‘in the light of the relevant GATT provisions’ and these provisions did not 
provide such a justification for import restrictions”. [emphasis added] (Japan- 
Leather § 44)  
 
In the Canada-Periodicals case, Canada restricted the publication of split-run 
magazines marketed in Canada. A split-run magazine has substantially the same 
content as a foreign publication, but contains advertisements aimed at the 
Canadian market. The Canadian government argued that larger US publications 
which run split run Canadian editions threatened to supplant Canadian culture 
unless Canada adopted import restrictions. Canada indeed prohibited the import of 
split-run periodicals that contained advertisement directed at the Canadian market 
that did not appear in the home country edition of that periodical. In 1993, a US 
corporation found a way around the import ban, publishing a Canadian edition of 
Sports Illustrated by transmitting electronically the editorial content from its US 
edition to a press in Canada. In response, the parliament imposed a tax on split-run 
periodicals equal to 80% of the value of all the advertising revenue earned by the 
edition. The tax made it unprofitable to publish a split run edition in Canada. The 
US challenged the Canadian measure before a WTO panel, arguing that the 
Canadian ban violated the prohibition on import ban under GATT Article XI and that 
the tax violated the national treatment provision under GATT Article III.  
Canada responded first that the dispute concerned access to advertising services 
and should be subject to the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). 
Under GATS, Canada did not make any commitment to grant national treatment to 
advertising services. Second, Canada argued that even if the GATT did apply, split-
run magazines are not like products as their intellectual content make them 
different. As an author puts it, ‘at its heart, this disagreement mirrored an 
underlying value difference between the United States and Canada; in the view of 
the United States, there was no essential difference between cultural commodities 
like magazines or books and other commodities like automotive parts’ (Paul 2000-
2001). In the view of Canada, cultural products had a specificity that distinguished 
them from ordinary items of trade.  
The panel found that both GATT and GATS were applicable and accepted the US 
view that split-run periodicals were like Canadian magazines, and thus deemed that 
the Canadian measures were inconsistent with the GATT. The Panel highlighted that 
‘despite the Canadian claim that the purpose of the legislation is to promote 
publications of original Canadian content, this definition essentially relies on factors 
external to the Canadian market- whether the same editorial content is included in 
a foreign edition and whether the periodical carries different advertisements in 
foreign editions’(Canada-Periodicals Panel Report, § 5.24). The Appellate Body 
voided the Panel’s finding that split-run periodicals and domestic periodicals were 
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like products; rather it deemed them to be directly competitive or substitutable 
products. In conclusion, the AB concurred with the Panel that the tax afforded 
protection to domestic products in violation of GATT Article III.  
More recently, in China-Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products, the 
US alleged that various Chinese restrictions on the importations and distribution of 
US films sound recordings and publications violated provisions of the GATT, GATS 
and the Accession Protocol. The challenged measures included prohibiting foreign 
owned enterprises from importing the relevant products, requiring publication 
import entities to be fully owned and subject to an approval system pursuant to a 
state plan, granting trading rights in a discretionary manner. China tried to justify 
diverse measures in the media domain invoking, inter alia, the UNESCO Convention 
and the related UNESCO Declaration on Cultural Diversity. The US, however, 
recalled that ‘the UNESCO Convention expressly provides: “Nothing in this 
Convention shall be interpreted as modifying the rights and obligations of the 
parties under any other treaties to which they are parties”’. The US went on to say 
that ‘in any event, nothing in the text of the WTO Agreement provides an exception 
from WTO disciplines in terms of “cultural goods”, and China’s Accession Protocol 
likewise contains no such exception’(China- Publications and Audiovisual Products § 
4.207, citing the Oral statement of the United States at the first substantive 
meeting of the Panel).   
China’s attempt to use the CCD as a shield was unsuccessful. The Panel held that 
restrictions on the distribution of publications violated Articles XVI and XVII of GATS 
and the national treatment requirement under GATT and found a number of 
Chinese measures inconsistent with the Accession Protocol. The Panel’s report was 
uphold by the Appellate Body, despite China’s request to be ‘mindful’ of the specific 
dual nature of cultural goods and services (China- Publications and Audiovisual 
Products AB Report § 25).  
China also invoked Article XX(a) GATT which embodies the public morals exception, 
arguing that ‘[…] reading materials and finished audiovisual products are so-called 
cultural goods, i.e. goods with cultural content […] with a potentially serious 
negative impact on public morals’(China- Publications and Audiovisual Products 
Panel Report § 7.751). China explained that ‘as vectors of identity, values and 
meaning, cultural goods play an essential role in the evolution and definition of 
elements such as societal features, values, ways of living together, ethics and 
behaviours.’ (China- Publications and Audiovisual Products Panel Report § 7.751). 
In this sense, China made express reference to Article 8 of the Universal 
Declaration on Cultural Diversity, which states that cultural goods ‘must not be 
treated as mere commodities or consumer goods’(China- Publications and 
Audiovisual Products Panel Report § 7.751). Therefore, in consideration of the 
major impact that cultural goods can have on public morals, China argued that it 
was legitimate to adopt a content review mechanism so as to prevent the 
dissemination of cultural goods that may negatively affect public morals(China- 
Publications and Audiovisual Products Panel Report § 7.752). China noted that the 
forbidden content ranged from ‘violence or pornography to other important values, 
including the protection of the Chinese culture and traditional value [emphasis 
added].’ (China- Publications and Audiovisual Products Panel Report § 7.753). 
The United States did not challenge the argument that the measures at stake were 
measures to protect public morals but the appropriateness of the selected means to 
achieve the objective to protect public morals (China- Publications and Audiovisual 
Products Panel Report § 7.756). The Panel noted China’s reference to the 
Declaration on Cultural Diversity and stated that since China had not invoked the 
Declaration as a defence to its breaches of trading rights commitments, but it had 
referred to the Declaration ‘as support for the general proposition that the 
importation of products of the type at issue in this case could, depending on their 
content have a negative impact on public morals in China’, ‘it had no difficulty in 
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accepting this general proposition’(China- Publications and Audiovisual Products 
Panel Report footnote 538). 
The panel admitted the applicability of Article XX (a) referring to the previous 
decision US-Gambling: 
 
“The panel in US-Gambling, in an interpretation not questioned by the Appellate 
Body, found that ‘the term public morals denotes standards of right and wrong 
conduct maintained by or on behalf of a community or nation’. The panel went on 
to note that ‘the content of these concepts for Members can vary in time and space, 
depending upon a range of factors, including prevailing social, cultural, ethical and 
religious values’. The panel went on to note that Members in applying this and 
other similar societal concepts, ‘should be given some scope to define and apply for 
themselves the concepts of public morals […] in their respective territories, 
according to their own systems and scales of values’ [internal citations omitted]”. 
(China- Publications and Audiovisual Products Panel Report § 7.759) 
 
However, the panel found that, because there was at least one other reasonably 
available alternative, China had not demonstrated that the relevant provisions were 
‘necessary’ (China- Publications and Audiovisual Products Panel Report § 7.913). 
This holding was confirmed by the AB. 
 
7. Critical Assessment  
Two competing epistemic perspectives seem to emerge from the available case law: 
while WTO adjudicators have tended to adopt a rather strict trade-oriented 
approach, arbitral tribunals have adopted a more flexible approach. If one analyses 
the rhetorical structure of WTO bodies, it is evident that the cultural claim has 
never been addressed explicitly. In Japan- Leather, the Panel noted that Japan had 
not made reference to any GATT provision in its pleading to justify the maintenance 
of its quota and held that ‘the special historical, cultural and socio-economic 
circumstances referred to by Japan could not be taken into account by it in this 
context since its terms of reference were to examine the matter ‘in the light of the 
relevant GATT provisions’ and these provisions did not provide such a justification 
for import restrictions’ (Japan- Leather, at § 44). Rightly or wrongly, in the Canada-
Periodicals case, the panel incidentally dismissed the cultural arguments put 
forward by Canada holding that ‘the ability of a Member to take measures to 
protect its cultural identity was not an issue in the present case’ (Canada –
Periodicals Panel Report, § 5.45). More importantly, cultural arguments were not 
discussed autonomously but were ‘encoded in the determination of what is a like, 
directly competitive or substitutable product’ and ‘translated … into a more 
technocratic argument about the common characteristics of different products’ 
(Paul 2000-2001 p. 51).     
The China-Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products, albeit adjudicated 
after the inception of the CCD, does not significantly change the argumentative 
framework of both panel and AB. The panel did not make reference to the CCD in 
its ratio decidendi, and noted China’s reference to the Declaration on Cultural 
Diversity only incidentally. While the panel considered the declaration, it did so in a 
footnote. Do footnotes have the same value as the main text of the report? What if 
China had referred to the Declaration as a defence to possible breaches of trading 
rights? Finally, scrutinizing the very lexicon adopted by the panel and the AB in this 
case one also spots the singularity that the panel did not refer to reading materials 
and audiovisual products as ‘cultural products’ but adopted the periphrasis 
‘products of the type at issue in this case’ (China- Publications and Audiovisual 
Products, Panel report, footnote 538). Similarly the AB did not refer to audiovisual 
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products as cultural products but again indicated them as ‘specific types of goods 
that China considers to be ‘cultural goods’ (China- Publications and Audiovisual 
Products, AB Report § 141). Instead, international law scholars have made use of 
the term cultural products (Voon 2007 and 2010). 
Instead, the focus of both panels and AB was the question as to whether given 
regulatory measures were authentically cultural or a disguised restriction to trade. 
This is the hard core of economic law adjudication. The claimant who brings a claim 
before the WTO bodies will always attempt to have her claims rooted in WTO law 
mainstream provisions. Third parties will also be interested in the further 
liberalization of a given market. For instance, in Japan- Measures on Imports of 
Leather, Pakistan expressed concerns that ‘some hidden elements of discrimination 
were involved in the quota allocation’ (Japan- Leather, § 39). In the Canada-
Periodicals case, as culture was assimilated to a commodity, the Canadian motive 
became indistinguishable from protecting any other domestic industry threatened 
by imports. In sum, ‘economic factors drive the WTO analysis’ and ‘in the cultural 
arena, the prism will be focused on economic values only’ (Loeb 2000). 
International economic law scholars have somehow ratified this approach deeming 
it ‘less imaginative but solid’ (Burri Nenova 2008, p. 28). In case of a direct collision 
between international cultural norms and WTO norms, it has been argued that 
‘applying the UNESCO Convention conflict of norms provision, as formulated in 
Article 20, can achieve little, since no modification of rights and obligations of the 
parties […] follows’ (Burri Nenova 2008, p. 29). Again, when referring to Article 20, 
reference is made to Article 20 (2) of the CCD instead of referring to this provision 
in a holistic fashion (Burri Nenova 2008, p. 29). Instead, as Pauwelyn puts it, 
Article 20 CCD ‘goes both ways’ (Pauwelyn 2005). As WTO law does not provide for 
a cultural exception arguably the clash will always be deemed as ‘indirect’ by WTO 
adjudicative bodies.  
Instead, within investor-state arbitration, one may identify underlying processes 
that lead to a different consideration of cultural concerns. In the Glamis Gold Case, 
the arbitral tribunal adopted a high standard of review, according deference to the 
federal and state legislative measures. The arbitral tribunal recognized that: ‘It is 
not the role of this Tribunal or any international tribunal, to supplant its own 
judgment of underlying factual material and support for that of qualified domestic 
agency’ vicinity’ (Glamis Gold Award, § 779) and that ‘governments must 
compromise between the interests of competing parties.’ vicinity’ (Glamis Gold 
Award, § 803). The tribunal admitted that ‘some cultural artifacts will indeed be 
disturbed, if not buried, in the process of excavating and backfilling’ (Glamis Gold 
Award, § 805), but it held that ‘the sole inquiry for the tribunal […] is whether or 
not there was a manifest lack of reasons for the legislation’. The tribunal deemed 
that there was a reasonable connection between the harm and the proposed 
remedy and that the claimant was using too narrow a definition of artefacts: ‘there 
are, in addition to pot shards, spirit circles, and the like, sight lines, teaching areas 
and view shields that must be protected and would be harmed by significant pits 
and waste piles in the near vicinity’ (Glamis Gold Award, § 805).    
In Lemire v Ukraine, the arbitral tribunal widely acknowledged Ukraine’s cultural 
concerns, but also imposed schemes of good governance, requiring the respect of 
investment treaty provisions prohibiting discrimination. With regard to the domestic 
content requirements, the arbitral tribunal adopted an evaluative comparative 
approach (Vadi 2010) that can contribute to develop global administrative law 
principles (Wuertenberger and Karacz 2008-2009). In particular, the arbitral 
tribunal held that ‘a rule cannot be said to be unfair, inadequate, inequitable or 
discriminatory when it has been adopted by many countries around the world’ 
(Lemire v Ukraine, § 506). Although the tribunal did not reflect on the systemic 
consequences of this comparative rule, one may clearly identify the positive role 
that such an approach has to build coherence at the international law level. More 
importantly, the tribunal was not driven by a cost-benefit analysis or a review of 
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the efficiency of the national measure; rather it was interested in its ‘normality’ i.e. 
assessing whether it was a regulatory choice divergent from the canons commonly 
accepted by the international community. 
 
8. The Role of Adjudicators 
What is the role of adjudicators in the potential convergence, or indeed 
fragmentation of international cultural law and international economic law? Since 
the interplay between these regulatory fields is not clearly spelt out in the text of 
treaties, with some exceptions, there no sort of pre-established harmony. In this 
fragmented landscape where arbitral tribunals and WTO bodies seem to have the 
last word on important themes at the cross road between culture and economics, 
the role of epistemic communities that is adjudicators is of fundamental 
importance. This section shall investigate whether the appointment process and the 
different composition of WTO panels and the AB on the one hand, and arbitral 
tribunals on the other, can shape the different epistemic approaches adopted by 
these bodies. 
WTO panels are established by the Dispute Settlement Body which is a political 
organ composed by the representatives of all members (Van Den Bossche 2008 p. 
235). The DSB also appoints the Members of the Appellate Body and adopt panel 
and Appellate Body Reports (DSU, Article 2.4). Once a panel is established by the 
DSB, the Secretariat proposes nominations for the panel to the parties to the 
dispute. The Secretariat maintains a list of potential panellists, which is composed 
by people nominated by Member States. The importance of the composition of the 
panel is shown by the fact that although the DSU requires the parties to the dispute 
not to oppose nominations except for compelling reasons (DSU Article 8.6), parties 
‘often reject the nominations initially proposed by the Secretariat without much 
justification’, thus the composition of the panel ‘is often a difficult and contentious 
process, which may take many weeks’ (Van Den Bossche 2008, p. 246). If the 
parties are unable to agree on the composition of the panel, either party may 
request the Director-General of the WTO to determine the composition of the panel. 
The Director General has determined the composition of about half of the panels 
(DSU Article 8.6).   
Panels are often composed of well-qualified government trade officials with a 
background in law, diplomats of WTO members, legal practitioners and, 
increasingly, academics who may have taught or published on international trade 
law or policy (DSU, Article 8.1). The DSU explicitly provides that panellists shall 
serve in their individual capacities and not as government representatives(DSU, 
Article 8.9). Nationals of members that are parties or third parties to the dispute 
shall not serve on a panel concerned with that dispute unless the parties to the 
dispute agree otherwise (DSU, Article 8.3). With regard to disputes involving a 
developing country member and a developed country member, the panel shall, if 
the developing country so requests, include at least one panellist from a developing 
country Member (DSU, Article 8.9). 
Unlike panels, the AB is a standing international tribunal, composed of seven 
persons ‘of recognized authority, with demonstrated expertise in law, international 
trade and the subject matter of the covered agreements generally’(DSU, Article 
17.3). Its membership shall be broadly representative of membership in the WTO 
(DSU, Article 17.3). 
Instead, in investor-state arbitration, the parties to the dispute select two 
arbitrators who will appoint the third arbitrator or the president of the arbitral 
tribunal (Parra 2007, p. 47). Although ‘the rationale underlying international judicial 
appointments remains mostly implicit in both the law and political science 
literatures’ (Voeten 2008-2009, p. 391),  sociological factors matter when one 
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scrutinizes whether and how the parties take advantage of the freedom offered to 
them (Goldštajn 1989). The parties perceive the selection of their own arbitrator as 
an advantage (Park 2010). In general terms, arbitrators are usually selected among 
persons who have expertise or experience in international law, international trade, 
or dispute resolution. For instance, ‘[NAFTA] panelists are chosen from rosters of 
experts established by the Parties in each NAFTA country. Panelists must be of high 
standing, good character, objective, reliable and have sound judgment and general 
familiarity with international trade law. The majority of the members of a panel, 
including the Chair, must be lawyers’( NAFTA Secretariat 2010)  
While WTO panels have not always included persons with legal background, a legal 
background is a commonality in investment arbitration (Costa 2011), although 
there is no requirement for arbitrators to have expertise or experience relevant to 
the peculiar subject matter of the dispute. On the other hand, arbitrators tend to be 
a more homogenous group than WTO panellists and AB members. Authors have 
pointed out the inadequate representation of developing countries (Waibel et al. 
2010) and gender imbalance among arbitrators. In 2005 women comprised only 
five percent of ICSID conciliators and arbitrators (Goldhaber 2004, Gal-Or 2007). 
Usually, arbitrators are ‘exceptionally talented individuals’, speak ‘multiple 
languages’(Rogers 2004-2005) and have studied at prestigious universities 
(Dezaley and Garth 1996), exercised the legal profession or taught in two or more 
jurisdictions and are therefore exposed to more than one legal culture. 
Globalization has globalized legal careers (Ginsburg 2003 and Vadi 2010). Expertise 
in public international law or constitutional and administrative law is a common 
feature in the arbitrator’s profile (Costa 2011). Indeed, some arbitrators have been 
professors of public international law or administrative law or judges in other 
international fora, including but not limited to the ICJ and regional human rights 
courts. This feature is of relevance and may informally promote the coherence of 
international law. On the other hand, the fact that the profile of these scholars is 
not strictly speaking rooted in a single country make them less dependant on 
possible national influences. Finally, ‘different career background may have 
predictable behavioural implications’ as former diplomats ‘show a much greater 
respect for the raison d’état than do…academics’ (Voeten 2008-2009 p. 390).  
Some studies have analysed the arbitrators’ judicial patterns through economic 
spectacles, theorizing that as utility maximizers, arbitrators may have an economic 
incentive to rule in favour of prospective claimants i.e. foreign companies to 
increase their chances of reappointment in future disputes. To counter the 
appearance of bias, some authors have proposed the establishment of a World 
Investment Court (Van Harten 2007 and 2008), or that any arbitrator should be 
chosen jointly or selected by a neutral body (Paulsson 2010). Nonetheless recent 
empirical studies based on statistical analysis have shown ‘no tendency of any 
group of arbitrators […] to rule in favour of investors’ (Franck 2009, Kepeliuk 2010 
p. 54). Authors have stressed that the arbitrators’ valuable professional reputation 
is a key incentive for them to be impartial (Kepeliuk 2010 p. 54).  
This paper questions whether the background of arbitrators in international law 
results in the absence of any superiority complex vis-á-vis other branches of 
international law. In the mentioned cases, arbitrators have settled cultural diversity 
related disputes in a contextual, dynamic fashion. While the ability of adjudication 
to function and to achieve desirable adjudicatory results is clearly important, the 
interest of society in the legitimate exercise of authority and the maintenance of 
juridical values is equally important (Carbonneau 2003 p. 1205). The fact that 
economic standards of valuation are not the only ones that are taken into account 
by arbitral tribunals is distinctive. Economics cannot supply the single standard for 
adjudication. While investor-state arbitration deals with an area at the crossroad 
between economics and law, the legal dimension of these disputes cannot be 
neglected or dismissed in favor of purely economical considerations. 
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The applicable law surely plays a role: the “covered agreements” under the aegis of 
the WTO differ from investment treaties. Analyzing the arbitrators’ patterns through 
socio-legal lens may lead to nuanced outcomes. Socio-legal studies conceive ‘law as 
a social product – a complex of activities of real people with socially shared and 
produced but individually carried out legal and non legal ideas, beliefs, motivations 
and purposes’ (Tamanaha 2008, p. 89-90). For sure, arbitrators have a cultural 
capital which encompasses a set of attitudes, knowledge and language as well as 
the structural constraints within which international lawyers live and work 
(Koskenniemi 2001, p. 2). The background of arbitrators influences their cognitive 
framework, heuristics and legal reasoning. However, the hypothesis that the socio-
legal factors that characterize the composition and the selection process of WTO 
bodies and investment tribunals matter remains unproven. Whether the cultural 
capital of some arbitrators leads to “better” settlement of cultural diversity related 
disputes remains an open question; whether and how sociological factors impact 
the final outcome of the arbitral process remain immeasurable. Broad judgements 
about the adjudicators in either context based on a review of a limited number of 
cases cannot be made. Further research is needed in this sense. 
 
Conclusions 
Cultural diversity is a legacy for everyone as it reveals the past and yields a sense 
of identity for present and future generations. In the broad sense, cultural diversity 
does not merely refer to audiovisual products or cultural goods, but to culture 
meant in a broad and sophisticated manner inclusive of both tangible and intangible 
cultural heritage. The UNESCO has provided an articulated regulatory framework 
for the protection of cultural diversity in its broad sense and has framed the 
protection of cultural diversity within the limits of the respect of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms. As cultural diversity represents a precondition for human 
development and economic growth, it needs to be brought to the mainstream of 
development thinking and practice.  
The impact of economic globalization on cultural diversity is by no means a novel 
area of study. However, a comparison of the dissonant judicial modes of cultural 
economic governance of WTO panels and AB on the one hand and arbitral tribunals 
on the other was missing. This article has provided a snapshot of a number of 
cultural diversity related disputes adjudicated before arbitral tribunals and WTO 
panels and AB. While space constraints have prevented a full discussion of 
normative issues (Vadi 2009), this paper has analysed and critically assessed the 
rhetoric and argumentative patterns used within international economic 
adjudication.  
Because international cultural treaties do not include compulsory dispute settlement 
mechanisms, cultural diversity related disputes have gravitated towards 
international economic fora. The magnetism of international economic fora has 
been a mixed blessing (Cho 2009 p.675). On the one had the global administrative 
review of substantive domestic regulations can improve good governance and the 
transparent pursuit of legitimate cultural policies. On the other hand, the 
hermeneutical pathways that the WTO DSB and arbitral tribunals have adopted 
have sensibly diverged. While the WTO DSB has opened itself to ‘charges of 
epistemological imperialism, and positive simple mindedness’ (Scott 2007 p. 3), 
arbitral tribunals have adopted a different approach. While WTO panels and AB 
have not considered cultural concerns as related to the subject matter of the 
dispute, arbitrators have often referred to international law principles and cases in 
their reasoning. These results open up new lines of enquiry that can enrich 
international economic law scholarship. Whether these different outcomes may 
depend on the different appointment mechanism and legal background of the 
arbitrators is open to debate and further study.  
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